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the property owner receive just compensation.
Furthermore,
if such a position is adopted, assessed value does not bind the
condemnor; it is merely used as some evidence of value for the
consideration of the trier of fact.
In jurisdictions in which there is no requirement that property
be assessed at market value or where the inaccuracy of assessments
has been statistically proven, refusal to admit assessed value seems
justified. The courts in such jurisdictions are forced to utilize
rules of evidence to compensate for this inadequate assessment
procedure. Statutory re-evaluation of both assessment and its
admissability is necessary in such jurisdictions. But, in jurisdictions
in which the assessment relates to market value, assessed value
may be given the weight to which an act of a public official is
entitled. A recent assessment is a disinterested statement by an
expert and may be an invaluable assistance in the determination
of just compensation.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INSOLVENCY

A

-

REAPPRAISAL

Equity courts have long imposed rather narrow restrictions
on the availability of specific performance as a remedy for breach
of contract. These restrictions are controlled by the concept of
the adequacy of the remedy at law. The plaintiff's prayer for
specific performance depends for its success on his ability to
demonstrate that the remedy at law is, in fact, inadequate. Showing
the uniqueness of the subject matter of the contract or the speculative
character of the damages is usually sufficient to demonstrate such
inadequacy. However, the insolvency of the defendant has generally
not been accepted as a sufficient basis. It will be the purpose of
this note to examine the soundness of this position and to explore
the possibility of arriving at a more satisfactory alternative.
Specific Performance in General
Specific performance of a breached contract has long been
considered by courts of equity to be an exceptional remedy, as
contrasted to the ordinary relief of money damages. This attitude
reflects the general character of equitable relief as complementary
and supplementary to relief at law.' It has been the historical
function of courts of equity to provide an injured party with an
effective remedy only in those cases where the remedy at law is
'WALsir,

EQ rry 22-26 (1930).
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nonexistent or inadequate. In contracts for the sale of land, the
legal remedy of damages is presumptively inadequate in that every
tract of land is deemed unique in and of itself and not on the basis
of its fertility or mineral contents.2 Thus, the vendee of such a
contract ordinarily need only show the subject of the sale to be a
tract of land in order to support his prayer for equitable relief.
Similarly, in contracts for the sale of chattels, the plaintiff-buyer
may be entitled to specific relief if he can show that the chattel
is of such a unique character that it cannot be replaced in any
market with the damages which might be obtained at law from the
vendor.3 The inadequacy of the remedy at law is shown when
plaintiff establishes, as to the particular chattel involved, that
there is no substitute of comparable character and value available,
as in the case of a work of art. Equity also recognizes a third
situation wherein inadequacy of the legal remedy is present, i.e.,
where the contract which has been breached is of such a character
that the assessment of damages by a jury would be speculative and
of doubtful compensatory effect. In cases involving such contracts,
specific relief has been granted on the theory that, in the particular
case, equitable relief is the only remedy which is capable of substantially compensating the injured party for the breach. 4 In
each of these situations, equity interposes its jurisdiction to grant
specific relief because, without it, the injured party could not
be adequately compensated at law. In the case of contracts for
the sale of land, this is presumed to be so, whereas, in contracts
for the sale of chattels, it is found to be so on the basis of
special circumstances involved in the subject matter or provisions
of the contracts.
Specilic Performance and Insolvency
Where the plaintiff seeks to predicate the inadequacy of his
remedy at law for breach of a contract to sell chattels, not on
the uniqueness of the chattels nor on the speculative nature of
the damages, but solely on the insolvency of the defendant, equity
courts have arrived at conflicting conclusions as to the propriety
of granting specific relief. 5 The courts that have taken the
position that insolvency is not by itself a sufficient basis for specific
relief, have done so on the basis of the traditional equity concept
of inadequacy. Disregarding the practical inability to collect dam2

Kitchen v. Herring, 42 N.C. 190 (1851).

34 WALSHa, EQuiry 307 (1930).

Texas Co. v. Central Fuel Oil Co., 194 Fed. 1 (8th Cir. 1912); Eastern
Rolling Mills v. Michlovitz, 157 Md. 51, 145 At. 378 (1929); Waddle v.
Cabana, 220 N.Y. 18, 114 N.E. 1054 (1917).
5 See generally Horack, Insolvency and Specific Perfornance, 31 HARv.
L. Rnv. 702 (1918).
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ages from an insolvent defendant, such courts have generally taken
the position that "the remedy is what is to be looked at. If it
exists, and is ordinarily adequate, its possible want of success is not
a consideration." '6 In effect, if the legal remedy is adequate in
the general class of cases, the peculiarities involved in a particular
case are not a sufficient basis for departing from the general rule.
Thus, in McLaughlin v. Piatti,7 decided in 1865, the court denied
specific performance of a contract to sell cattle on the grounds
that the chattels involved were not unique, that damages at law
were not too speculative, and, further, that the accident of insolvency had no effect on equity's jurisdiction to grant specific
performance. 8 The position of the court was that, assuming the
solvency of the defendant, the case was not one which contained
one of the traditional equitable bases for specific relief. This position has been taken in later cases and stated very clearly in
terms of the theoretical efficacy of the remedy at law, with little
or no discussion of the practical inadequacy of a judgment which
cannot be collected because of the defendant's insolvency.9
In contrast to the foregoing position, the Massachusetts court
in Clark v. Flint"0 declared:
If the party injured by a breach of a contract cannot avail himself
of his remedy at law for any beneficial purpose, or if it be doubtful
whether he can or not, a court of equity, if it can relieve him, ought
certainly to interpose, and compel the other party to perform his
contract. 1
Such an approach involves a more practical, less technical concept
of adequacy in that the mere form of the legal remedy is not
controlling where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant's
insolvency will, in reality, render such remedy wholly ineffective
to compensate him for defendant's breach. Courts utilizing this
approach consider the illusory character of plaintiff's remedy at
law 1 2 and perhaps grant relief on the basis of the general principle
that the remedy available at law is inadequate unless it is "as
I Heilnan v. Union Canal Co., 37 Pa. 100, 104 (1860).
727 Cal. 452 (1865).
s d. at 463.
9
E.g., Hendry v. Whidden, 48 Fla. 268, 37 So. 571 (1904); Cincinnati
MR. v. Washburn, 25 Ind. 259 (1865); Gillett v. Warren, 10 N.M. 523, 62
Pac. 975 (1900).
21 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 231 (1839). Compare the approach of Parker v.
Garrison, 61 Ill. 250 (1871).
12 Id. at 238.
12 See Draper v. Stone, 71 Me. 175 (1880)
(dictum). See also Dilburne
v. Youngblood, 85 Ala. 449, 5 So. 175 (1888); Avery v. Ryan, 74 Wis. 591,
43 N.W. 317 (1889).
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practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration, as the remedy in equity." 13
Still other courts have dealt with the problem of defendant's
insolvency as affecting plaintiff's right to specific relief by finding
it to be but one factor which might, in a given case, be controlling as to the exercise of the established jurisdiction to grant
specific performance.'4 The distinction is that between viewing
insolvency as an independent ground for jurisdiction to grant specific
relief and insolvency as an important factor in determining whether
to exercise that jurisdiction. Thus, in Parker v. Garrison,5 where
the vendor had received full payment from the vendee for the
crops which were the subject matter of the contract, the court
considered the vendor's subsequent insolvency to be sufficient to
render the vendee's remedy at law inadequate, and granted specific
performance. Alternatively, the court declared that, on these facts,
a constructive trust could be utilized to provide the plaintiff with
the same relief.16 So too, in Livesley v. Johnston, 7 the plaintiffvendee had advanced funds for the cultivation of crops by
defendant-vendor and, upon the insolvency of the defendant,
the court granted the vendee specific performance. The court
held that insolvency, although by itself insufficient for equitable relief, when taken with the "joint venture" character
of the contract, which impressed on the parties a trust
relationship, 8 warranted specific performance. In these cases, the
factor of insolvency was purportedly only one consideration affecting
the determination of the propriety of equitable relief and, in each
case, the court ostensibly found a distinct and separate basis for
granting such relief. But, as pointed out in Bowman v. Adams, 9
the equitable "title" or interest of the vendee in a contract for the
sale of chattels is itself based upon such vendee's right to specific
performance because of the uniqueness of the chattel or the inability
to measure damages accurately.2 0 Thus, to conclude that a vendee,
in a contract for the sale of ordinary chattels, should get specific
relief because he has some equitable interest, whether in trust or
not, the court must weigh precisely the same factors which would
be involved in determining whether to grant specific performance. 2'
The constructive trust as an independent ground for specific performance is merely a statement of a conclusion which begs the
Ex'rs v. Grundy, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 210, 215 (1830).
Heilman v. Union Canal Co., 37 Pa. 100 (1860).

13 Boyce's
14

15 61 Ill.
250 (1871).
16 Id. at 254.
1745 Ore. 30, 76 Pac. 946 (1904).

isId. at 52, 76 Pac. at 951. See also Livesley v. Heise, 45 Ore. 148, 76
Pac. 952 (1904).
19 45 Idaho 217, 261 Pac. 679 (1927).
20 Id. at 225-26, 261 Pac. at 682.
21
Note 82 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 517 (1934).
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,question. As a result, the cases purportedly dealing with insolvency
as a factor, merely complementary to other factors which are
sufficient to grant specific relief,
are, in fact, based solely on the
22
insolvency of the defendant.
Injunctions and the Insolvent Defendant
It is interesting to note that equity is much more willing to
grant the specific relief of injunction against an insolvent defendant
who threatens damage to property. 23 In such cases, the courts have
recognized that the adequacy of the legal remedy is not a matter
of formal efficacy, but, rather, a matter of the actual results which
the plaintiff will acquire through recovery and satisfaction of a
judgment. Where the property involved is of no unique value, the
legal remedy is ordinarily completely effective against a solvent
defendant since, with such damages, the plaintiff can restore his
property to its condition prior to the wrong committed by the
defendant. 24
Where, however, the defendant is insolvent, the
denial of an injunction to the plaintiff whose property is threatened
leaves him with the prospect of damage to such property for which
he cannot hope to be compensated. In such a case, equity grants
whatever relief may be necessary in order to protect the plaintiff, 25
and it does so solely on the ground that a judgment at law against
an insolvent defendant is clearly inadequate in any meaningful sense
of the term.
Effect of the Uniform Sales Act
In the ordinary situation lacking such unusual facts as would
induce equity to give great weight to the defendant's insolvency
in determining whether specific relief should be granted, the party
injured by the breach could only pursue his inadequate remedy
at law. The Uniform Sales Act operated generally to liberalize
the remedies available to contracting parties in the event of breach.
The rights of the buyer under the act depended upon the goods
having been ascertained 26 and on the allocation of title according
to the express or implied intent of the parties.2 7 The act provided
formulae by which the intent of the parties could be determined.
22Jbid.
23
Horack, mupra note 5, at 711.
24

See Burgess v. Kattleman, 41 Mo. 480 (1867); Brown v. Reed, 72 Neb.
167, 100 N.W. 143 (1904); Kistler v. Weaver, 135 N.C. 388, 47 S.E_ 478

(1904).
25

West v. Smith, 52 Cal. 322 (1877); Williams v. Carpenter, 14 Colo.
477,2 24 Pac. 558 (1890); Milan Steam Mills v. Hickey, 59 N.H. 241 (1879).
6 UNrORM SALES AcT § 17.
2
7The intent would be evidenced by the terms of the contract, the conduct
of the parties and usages of the trade. UxOR SALES Act § 18(1).
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One of the most important guidelines was the appropriation of
goods to the contract.28 Thus, if the seller, with the buyer's consent, set aside goods conforming to the contract and somehow
marked them for the buyer, these were appropriating acts sufficient to indicate that the parties intended that title should pass
to the buyer upon such appropriation.2 9 When a buyer could
establish such appropriation, he could recover such goods specifically
whether the seller was solvent or insolvent; the seller, upon appropriation, was liable to the buyer for goods as if he were a
bailee. 30 However, under the act, such presumptive intent to pass
title by appropriation could be overcome by evidence of the parties'
actual intent not to pass title. Thus, when title did not pass according to the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, the buyer was left
with his common-law remedy of damages for breach of contract
or restitution of his advance payment. Where the buyer could not
show title in himself, he was met, in any attempt to recover the
specific goods, with the traditional requirements of equity that the
goods be of unique character or that the court be unable to assess
damages with some degree of accuracy. 31 Outside the scope of these
Uniform Sales Act provisions, where the goods involved were
ordinary and damages for breach of a contract of sale could be
readily determined, the buyer was merely a general creditor of
the insolvent seller. Thus the buyer was aided in the case of the
seller's insolvency only where the buyer could show title to have
passed to him, according to the intent of the parties as determined
by the provisions of the act.
Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code
The shortcomings of the Uniform Sales Act in terms of modern
commercial practice led to the development and widespread adoption
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Under the Code, the legal
effects of the various aspects of a sale are determined by concrete
rules grounded in business realities, and are not dependent upon
a difficult determination of the intent of the parties. 32 One of
these business realities which gives rise to buyers' rights by such
a rule is identification of the goods to the contract.3 3 The Code
provides that such identification of the goods gives the buyer a
28

§ 19(4) (1).
Soss Mfg. Co. v. Mitchell Motors Co., 119 Misc. 290, 196 N.Y. Supp.
304 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
s0 Note, 79 HAxv. L. REv. 598, 599 (1966).
315 PoMERoY, EQuIrY § 2170, at 4877 (5th ed. 1941).
UNIFORM SALS Acr

29

32

See, e.g., UNIFoRm COMMERCIAL CODE

§§ 2-509, 2-510 (risk of loss);

§ 2-501 (insurable interest); 99 2-502, 2-716 (general remedies) [hereinafter
cited3 3 as U.C.C.].
U.C.C. § 2-501.
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"special property" in them, 34 and such special property is the basis
of a new buyer's right to specific performance in the case of seller's
insolvency.3 5 But, tbis buyer's right to the goods is available only
when he has paid part or all of the purchase price, and "if the
seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first
installment on their price." " The Code provision is an advance
over the case-law and Uniform Sales Act positions, in that identification is predicated on more readily determinable objective factors
and thus introduces a greater measure of certainty into the transactions to which it applies. The remedy, however, is severely
limited by the "within ten days" condition, and, in cases where
the insolvency of the seller occurs either before or after this time
37
period, the buyer would be confined to his pre-Code remedy.
It must be noted that the Code recites that the buyer has a right
to specific performance "where the goods are unique or in other
proper circumstances." 38 This provision would seem to be only
a restatement of the equitable doctrine of specific performance.3 9
Aside from this narrow remedy in the case of insolvency, the
buyer's right to the goods can be established only where he can show
title in himself by establishing that the goods have been identified
to the contract and that documents of title or the goods have been
delivered to him.40 Thus, except for the limited coverage provided by section 2-502, the problem of the seller's insolvency
and its effects on the rights of the buyer to obtain equitable relief
remains essentially the same as it was prior to the enactment of
the Code. In this regard, the courts have not reached consistent
positions and have shown little inclination to re-examine the question of insolvency as a basis for specific performance.41
Should Insolvency Alone be Sufficient for Specific Performance?
The arguments advanced by courts and commentators in opposition to the recognition of insolvency as an independent ground
for equitable jurisdiction to grant specific performance of contracts
fall into roughly three areas: (1) the remedy in law is theoretically
adequate and courts of equity should not hold otherwise merely on
the basis of the peculiar financial circumstances of a particular

34 U.C.C. § 2-501(1).
35 U.C.C. § 2-502(1).

Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
§ 1-103.
3s U.C.C. § 2-716(1).
39 "Other proper circumstances" would not seem to include insolvency,
which is specifically provided for in U.C.C. § 2-502.
40 U.C.C. § 2-401.
-' See American Cities Power & Light Corp. v. Williams, 189 Misc. 829,
835, 69 N.Y.S.2d 197, 203 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
36

7 U.C.C.
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defendant; 42 (2) the recognition of such a basis for equitable
jurisdiction would flood equity with all contract cases wherein
the defendant could be shown to be insolvent; -1 and (3) allowing
insolvency as a basis for specific performance would violate the
principle that equality is equity in that it would give the plaintiff
4
an unfair advantage over other general creditors. 4
The first argument, based on the formal presumption as to the
efficacy of judgments at law, seems clearly untenable in light of
the fact that defendants can be, and often are, judgment-proof

and:
[Wihen the defendant is insolvent . . . it is hardly a sufficient answer
[to the plaintiff] that the forms of legal procedure provided are perfect
. . . though the remedy thus provided will yield him no actual returns
. . . . The jurisdiction of equity being founded upon the inadequacy of
the legal remedy in the particular case before the court, what constitutes such inadequacy ought to be a matter of fact rather than
45
of theory.
It is no answer to say that equity grants relief only in a general
class of cases. Rather, equitable relief should be based on the
particular circumstances of the case before the court. Similarly,
if it be argued that cases involving non-determinable or highly
speculative damages themselves form a general class suitable for
equitable cognizance, why cannot it be said that cases in which
the defendants are insolvent also form a class suitable for equity's
interposition? The persisting basis for accepting the former, while
rejecting the latter, is that insolvency has not traditionally been
recognized as sufficient to constitute the "inadequacy" necessary
for equitable jurisdiction. But, the very justification for, and
function of, courts of equity was to provide relief where justice
required and the form and substance of the law provided noneThat "equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy" is a succinct, though over-simplified, statement of the nature of equitable
jurisprudence,4 and is extremely apt in pinpointing the weakness
of the position that a remedy at law, even though fruitless by
virtue of the defendant's insolvency, is an adequate remedy rendering equity's interposition unnecessary. In sum, the argument based
on the formal adequacy of law judgments runs counter to the
spirit and function of equity and cannot be sustained as a sufficient
reason for denying specific performance based on the defendant's
insolvency.
See cases cited supra note 9.
319 (1930).
Horack, Specific Performance and Insolvency, 31 HAlv. L. REv. 702,
7104 (1918).
5 Id. at 703. (Emphasis added.)
4
42

43 WALISH, EQUITY

44

6 McCLINToCK,

EQUITY 76 (2d ed. 1948).
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The second argument is based on the fear that the recognition
of insolvency as an independent ground for equitable jurisdiction
would result in the equity courts' supplanting the law courts in all
cases wherein the defendant can be shown to be insolvent. It
would seem that, as to this position, the primary inquiry should
be as to whether such a result is desirable. It seems beyond
dispute that, as between the plaintiff and the insolvent defendant,
the former should not be left with an ineffective remedy when,
without imposing any undue hardship on the latter, equity could
provide a complete remedy. This involves no denigration of the
law side of the court; rather, it merely gives recognition to the
fact that any judgment for money damages rendered against an
insolvent defendant is a mere exercise in form which leaves the
plaintiff with a Pyrrhic victory. This principle has been recognized
in some cases 4 7 and commentaries and further recognition of
its basic soundness may be found in legislation declaring that
the remedy of specific performance of a contract may not be
denied merely on the ground of an adequate remedy at law,
unless the defendant shows ownership of property which can be
applied to the satisfaction of a judgment or gives a bond to
assure his performance of the contract or payment of damages at
law.48 The objection that equity would assume a function previously allocated to the law courts loses its force when it is
recognized that, with a merged system of law and equity, it is
the same court, sitting in different capacities, which will decide
the issues. There will be a shift and no increase in the total
of litigation. Also, it will decide them on the basis of a realistic
concept of what is inadequate, rather than on the basis of a
purely formal concept which, despite the defendant's insolvency,
leaves the plaintiff actually without a remedy.
The third argument, i.e., that a prejudicial advantage goes to
the plaintiff as regards other creditors of the insolvent defendant,
presents more substantial grounds for objecting to the recognition
of insolvency as an independent ground for specific performance.
However, it is submitted that, even if such an objection is valid
in some situations, it should be effective to prevent equitable relief
only in those situations. Specific performance would be denied
where other creditors will be prejudiced, but not as part of a
blanket prohibition against recognizing insolvency as a basis
for equitable relief. Furthermore, such an approach is entirely
consistent with the traditional equitable principle that, even though
jurisdiction is complete, equity may, in its discretion, decline to
exercise that jurisdiction when to do so would prejudice the rights
of innocent third parties. Where, for instance, the party seeking
4 See cases cited supra note 12.
4 See MI>. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 169 (1957).
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specific performance has advanced part or all of the purchase
price with reference to particular goods in the seller's possession,
and not in general reliance on the seller's credit position, his
obtaining specific relief should not be viewed as constituting a
prejudicial advantage over general creditors who have relied on the
seller's overall financial position 49 since their positions are inherently
and essentially different in character. In such a case, equity's
concern in avoiding a decree which will injure innocent third parties
is not involved. As to the question of simple insolvency, it is
submitted that it should be a sufficient basis for specific relief
in all cases wherein it can be decreed in a manner consistent with
equity's traditional discretion to avoid injury to innocent third
persons.
Bankruptcy Proceedings
Where the insolvent vendor is subjected to bankruptcy proceedings, the granting of specific performance to the vendee creates
the possibility of a conflict with the intent and purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act to secure an equal distribution of the bankrupt's
assets among his creditors. 5 To achieve this end, the Bankruptcy
Act provides that the trustee in bankruptcy takes title to the
bankrupt's property as of the date of the petition in bankruptcy. 51
Furthermore, the trustee is expressly empowered to adopt or
reject executory contracts to which the bankrupt is a party 52
and the trustee will presumably exercise such power to maximize
the assets of the bankrupt's estate for the benefit of its creditors,
i.e., he would seek to adopt the contract where the remaining balance
of the purchase price exceeded the liquidation value of the goods
due to a fall in market price. Conversely, he would seek to
reject such a contract where a rising market has so affected the
liquidation value of the goods that such value exceeds the balance
due from the buyer on the contract price. It has been held that,
even where the plaintiff, under applicable state law, has an equitable
title in real property which would normally be given effect by a
decree of specific performance, the bankruptcy of the vendor and
the appointment of a trustee prior to the delivery of the deed
will make such plaintiff's right to specific performance subject to
the trustee's statutory power to adopt or reject such a contract.5 3
49
Hurley v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 213 U.S. 126, 134 (1909).
This principle is given some recognition in U.C.C. § 2-402 in that a seller's
unsecured creditor's right as to goods sold is subject to the buyer's right,
under § 2-502 or § 2-716, to specific performance of the contract.
50
MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTcY 288 (1956); WALsHr, EQurry 320 (1930).
5130 Stat 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964).
5230 Stat 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1964).
53
Matter of Phila. Penn Worsted Co., 278 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1960).
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"The trustee in bankruptcy may abandon burdensome property and
reject unprofitable executory contracts in order to further the best
interests of the estate." 54 Therefore, should the trustee reject
such contract, expressly or by statutory implication where he fails
to adopt or reject it," the injured vendee is left with only an action
for damages for breach of the contract. It seems clear that,
even if insolvency were to be accepted as a sufficient basis for
specific performance according to state law, the power of choice
residing in the trustee under the federal bankruptcy provisions
would prevail over such state law. In effect, then, the adoption
by state courts of the position that insolvency of the defendant
should alone be a sufficient ground for a decree of specific performance, will not diminish the rights of the trustee in bankruptcy, since the already recognized grounds for such equitable
relief are subject to the trustee's statutory powers. Thus, the
argument that the granting of specific performance against an
insolvent defendant contravenes the spirit of bankruptcy legislation
is without merit when it is recognized that specific performance
of a contract on any ground will not be given effect when the trustee
chooses to reject such a contract. In addition, any transfer of
the goods to the buyer, who has reasonable cause to believe the
seller is insolvent, within four months prior to the petition in
bankruptcy would seem to be voidable under the Bankruptcy Act.58
Thus, it would seem that a decree of specific performance granted
to a buyer from an insolvent seller would also be a preference
which could be avoided by the trustee in bankruptcy. But, again,
the argument that such a situation should prevent the recognition
of insolvency as a ground for specific performance goes too far,
since equity regards the equities of all parties and not just those
of the plaintiff. In effect, then, such recognition involves no
violation of bankruptcy legislation when it is expressly understood
as being relegated to the limitations imposed by bankruptcy
legislation.
Conclusion
The traditional attitude towards insolvency as not giving
rise to such an inadequacy in legal remedy to justify the granting
5

4

Matter of N.Y. Mut. Investors Group, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 51, 54

(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
5 30 Stat. 565 (1398), 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1964).

6
preference is defined by the act as any transfer within four months
before filing the petition, made by the debtor while insolvent, which has the
effect of enabling his creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
other creditors of the same class. 30 Stat. 562 (1398), 11 U.S.C. §96(a)
(1964). A preference is voidable by the trustee where the creditor benefiting thereby has, at the time the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe

that the debtor is insolvent. 30 Stat. 562 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1964).
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of equitable relief seems, quite clearly, both theoretically and
practically untenable. Very simply put, a money judgment for
damages which produces, and can produce, no money because
of the defendant's insolvency, is an "adequate" remedy only
in the most technical and unrealistic understanding of that term.
If equity truly looks to substance rather than form, and if its
function is to provide a remedy where justice demands that the
plaintiff be accorded a remedy, then equity must recognize the
insolvency of the defendant as a sufficient ground, in and of itself,
for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction. Such exercise, of course,
must be consistent with the totality of equitable jurisprudence so
that, if recognized, such jurisdiction would still be subject to
equity's traditional power of discretionary abstention when the
decree would result in undue hardship to third persons such as
creditors.
It is submitted, further, that the UCC's narrow
recognition of insolvency as a basis for specific performance increases, rather than decreases, the need for the general recognition
of such a remedy precisely because of the limited applicability
of the Code provision. The requirement that the seller become
insolvent within ten days from his receipt of the buyer's first
payment of the purchase price in order that the buyer might avail
himself of his specific performance remedy has its basis in the
concern for the possible fraudulent effect of a longer period of
retention on seller's other creditors. But, again, it is submitted
that if there are no other creditors or if their claims are such
that they will not be prejudiced by the relief granted, insolvency
of the defendant should be an independent ground for plaintiff's
obtaining specific performance and should be so apart from any
arbitrary time limit for the onset of defendant's insolvency. The
state of the law in this area is such that the courts should at least
re-examine the validity of their present positions, instead of merely
setting forth the negative position in summary fashion and assuming
its validity. It _seems probable that, were this re-examination
undertaken, the courts would reject the traditional technical basis
for excluding insolvency as a basis for equitable jurisdiction and
allow relief on that basis in all cases where such relief could be
granted in a manner consistent with other applicable equitable
considerations.

POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF ACCOUNTANTS TO THImD
PARTIES FOR NEGLIGENCE

A public accountant has a duty to his client to perform the
accounting services bargained for with the skill to be expected
of a reasonable, prudent man with his knowledge and training.

